spreads increased, and inter-bank spreads rose. Beyond these conduits, global shifts in market sentiment or 'risk aversion' which often manifest themselves through low public confidence and herd behaviour in markets have been particularly pronounced in this crisis. The sharp deterioration in household wealth in the advanced economies and concern about the overall soundness of the US economy and the exposure of hitherto unknown domestic structural vulnerabilities have resulted in a heightened sense of vulnerability and a rise in risk aversion. This has only led to further reduction in household consumption and precautionary saving.
Specific transmission channels: the cases of Egypt and Yemen
Between 2007 and mid-2008, the Egyptian economy had been growing at an unprecedented rate of about 7%. The unemployment rate was down from 11% to 8%, and the seemingly entrenched poverty levels were finally on the decline. The country's financial sector, especially banks and investment companies, were not large holders of subprime mortgage-backed securities -the so- ). Yet, these robust fundamentals have hardly made the Egyptian economy immune to the contagion emanating from the advanced economies. In large part this is because the resource poor or the non-oil exporting Arab countries such as Egypt already facing significant economic pressures and heavily depended on external assistance (in the form of aid, FDI, and through worker remittances) were from the outset extremely susceptible to exogenous economic shocks. In fact, countries such as Egypt and Yemen, but also Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon, depend much on exports, tourism, remittance receipts from workers abroad (largely from Europe and the GCC countries), and more recently through FDI flows. In most of these countries the revenue generated accounts for a substantial proportion of their GDP. A decline of these revenues both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP has had negative consequences for growth and development.
The Egyptian economy has been impacted via a number of broad transmission channels discussed above such as global deleveraging and a drop in export revenues, as well as country-specific ones such as contraction in the tourism industry and sharp reductions in Suez Canal tolls and remittances from expatriate workers. The sharp decline in export volumes to the Euro Area, East Asia and the United States has hit Egypt hard. Similarly, tourism, which is the country's major foreign exchange earner (bringing in some US$11 billion dollars in 2007), and contributing 8.5% of Egypt's GDP, has 
rapidly via franchising their operations throughout the region and lending to the Emirates booming real estate and construction sectors. However, foreign banks were not the only willing lenders. The UAE's banks and financial institutions in partnership with foreign subsidiaries also engaged in rampant speculative lending in real estate. Indeed, over the past decade, the UAE via its quasigovernment companies (including Nakheel, Emaar and Dubai Properties) invested billions in its property sector in an effort to diversify its economy and reduce dependence on the oil industry.
As a result, the UAE experienced a boom in property development -boasting more glittering skyscrapers than Manhattan -and with prices to match. The lid came off the real estate sector The 'unthinkable' shocking news about Nakheel served as a wake-up call and finally to underscore that Dubai's real estate bubble built on the back of borrowed cash and speculative investment was finally unravelling. As global deleveraging intensified, it led to a large contraction in liquidity and severe tightening of credit conditions, particularly in countries that were highly leveraged and Investors who had long been under the assumption of a blanket guarantee provided by the federation were clearly shocked and unnerved. Panicked investors fearing a possible bank-run, and at worst, a sovereign default (as the Dubai government felt no responsibility to guarantee the debts of a state-owned company), began to flee by retreating to the traditional safe haven: the US dollar.
The panic only subsided after the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates promised to 'stand behind' the region's banks by providing more emergency liquidity. Although fears have receded for now, the inability and unwillingness of the Dubai government to refinance the debt of its own company (Dubai World), has been a rude awakening for investors around the world. Investors can no longer take for granted the explicit backing governments have traditionally given to state-owned companies against insolvency. The reality is that governments around the world have responded to the financial crisis by taking on unsustainable levels of debt and many are simply no longer in a position to provide more finance -Dubai is a case in point. Finally, the manner in which the government of Dubai handled (or mishandled) this issue has done damage to its credibility and put a significant stain on its once stellar reputation as the premier place to do business in the Arab world. 
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